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I. INTRODUCTION
After eleven years and several failed attempts at modifying the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("the Act"), both the Senate
and the House of Representatives have reached an agreement on a di-
rection for the antibribery law,' a direction on which the Reagan Ad-
ministration concurred.3 Because of opposition to the changes, support-
ers buried the amendments to the Act deep within the omnibus trade
bil ,4 which promises to boost American exports and alleviate a stag-
gering trade deficit.5 The changes made to the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act were, to some observers, unnecessary and unjustified.' This
article describes the provisions of the original Act, the 1988 amend-
ments, and addresses the supporting and opposing arguments surround-
ing the modifications. In view of the expressed purpose of these
changes, this article analyzes three of the more controversial provisions
in the Act and determines whether these modifications are necessary to
effect the expressed purpose.
II. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
In response to discoveries of foreign corruption involving major
U.S. corporations, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 which imposed strict accounting standards and antibribery
prohibitions on American businesses. 7 While these scandals caused em-
barrassment to the nation and jeopardized American foreign interests
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1464 (1977)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a; 78m; 78dd-1; 78dd-2; 78ff (1982) [hereinafter Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act].
2. H.R. CONE. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 916-925 (1988).
3. Waldman, Back to Corporate Payoffs Abroad?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1988,
sec. A, at 31, col. 1.
4. Rushford, Business Lobby Hit for "Bring-Back-Bribery" Bill, Legal Times,
No. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
5. 134 CONG. REC. S4,216 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Senator Byrd).
6. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on
S. 430 Before Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy and the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (Statement of Senator Proxmire) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing].
7. Rushford, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
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abroad,8 the Act itself has provoked as much controversy as these ini-
tial improprieties. The current law is an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and requires issuers of stock, that is, publicly-
held corporations, to "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
tions . . . of the issuer" and to "devise and maintain a system of inter-
nal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" of
management control over the firm's assets.9 These accounting require-
ments provide a "paper trail" that leads to corporate accountability.10
The accounting requirements also serve as a mechanism for detecting
illicit payments to foreign government officials which is the other major
focus of the Act. Under the antibribery provisions, the Act prohibits
payment by an issuer or a domestic concern to any foreign official, ex-
cept foreign employees "whose duties are essentially ministerial or cler-
ical," for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business." Similarly,
the Act proscribes such payments to a third party while "knowing or
having reason to know" that the money will be used for the above pur-
pose.12 Under the original Act, both civil and criminal sanctions attach
to violations of the accounting and antibribery provisions.1 3
III. HISTORY OF THE ACT AND AMENDMENTS
Since the Act's passage in 1977, numerous attempts to modify it
have proved fruitless.14 In 1981 and again in 1983, changes almost
identical to the present amendments surfaced, but died, in the legisla-
ture.1 5 Supporters attempted different means by which to institute the
changes, for instance, by seeking to amend the Export Administration
Act rather than directly amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."
Until now, however, such efforts were unsuccessful.
8. Omnibus Trade Legislation, vol. IV: Hearing on H.R. 4389 Before the Sub-
comm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (Statement of Representative Wolpe) [hereinaf-
ter House Hearing].
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
10. 134 CONG. REC. S3,067 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1988) (statement of Senator
Proxmire).
11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2, 78ff (1982).
14. Graham, Viewpoints: Don't Dilute Law Curbing Bribery Overseas by Ameri-
can Companies, L.A. Times, June 15, 1986, sec. 4, at 3, col. 1.
15. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 1 (statement of Senator Heinz).
16. Gerth, Easing of Curbs in Law on Foreign Bribes Sought, N.Y. Times, April
16, 1986, sec. D, at 24, col. 1.
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A. Support for the Changes
The amendment's supporters point to the unnecessary ambiguities
as justifying the changes. In their view, uncertainty under the law has
increased the cost of international business, made firms exceedingly
cautious, and prompted businesses to forego legitimate foreign opportu-
nities for fear of violating the law.17 American firms alone have borne
the costs of the Act, and supporters contend some costs could be elimi-
nated with clarification."i These costs include the allocation of re-
sources to comply with the accounting standards, lost business, and
changes in business practices to meet the imposed standards.1 9 Statu-
tory vagueness has caused firms to err on the side of excess to protect
themselves against violations of the Act.2"
The strongest criticism of the Act is that it puts American export-
ers, particularly small and medium-sized exporters, at a competitive
disadvantage in world markets.2 Others, however, contend that there is
no evidence of an adverse effect on American exports.22 In a compara-
tive study of markets, John Graham found the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act had no negative effect on export performance in markets
where the Act is considered a trade disincentive and those where it is
not.23 Graham does admit, however, that the results of his study may
be the product of factors outside of the Act. According to Graham, the
lack of a competitive disadvantage to American exporters may result
from the loss of business by some American firms to other American
firms; from the fact that some intermediaries never actually remit brib-
ery money to foreign officials; or from the fact that American firms
could have attained the business without the payoffs.2 4 In each of these
cases, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would not have an impact on
the foreign transactions. Still, other studies, such as a 1981 General
Accounting Office report on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, docu-
17. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge, Secre-
tary of Commerce).
18. H. Weisberg & E. Reichenberg, Research Report, The Price of Ambiguity:
More Than Three Years Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Chamber of Com-
merce of the U.S. 2, 30 (1981).
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. at 1-2.
21. Graham, supra note 14 sec. 4, at 3, col. 1.
22. 134 CONG. REC. S3,068 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1988) (statement of Senator
Proxmire).
23. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT'L
BuS. STUDIES 107 (Win. 1984).
24. Graham, supra note 14, sec. 4 at 3, col. 1.
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ment the deterrent effect of the Act.25 Given the complexity of issues
that might influence trade, both sides tend to agree that the impact of
the Act on exports is difficult to measure with accuracy, but each side
claims empirical support for its position.2"
B. Opposition to the Changes
Opponents of the modifications focus on the effectiveness of the
current Act. Stating that the law has stopped the use of slush funds
and deterred corruption of foreign officials, Senator Proxmire points to
the policing aspects of the Act, that is, the fear of prosecution for vio-
lating the Act.27 Supporters of the amendments argued that the same
fear that deters corruption also deters the entrance into foreign trade
by American firms.
Other opponents of the amendments claim the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act represents the moral judgment of the nation that bribery
is wrong and that in the long run, it is in our interest to prevent it.28
The loss of business by American firms is to be expected and accepted
as a cost of that position. In this sense, our success in the free market
depends on others' perception of our ability to produce quality goods
and services without corruption.29 Under the current Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, that perception is reinforced. In fact, amendment oppo-
nents claim the law has strengthened the integrity of American trade
since American goods presently are bought on the basis of quality and
price, not illegal payments."°
Supporters of the 1977 Act say that the amendments return to a
"soft line" on bribery, and that this will undermine confidence in
American integrity and American goods. 31 Corruption in foreign gov-
ernments tends to destabilize these governments, increase the threat to
American interests there, and undercut our ability to do business in
those nations.32 Those who support the Act in its original form believe
that strong antibribery standards will minimize foreign corruption and
25. The Antibribery Act Splits Executives, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1983, at 16.
26. Brownstein, Financial Institutions Focus: Bribery Lessons, NAT'S J., Oct. 1,
1983, at 2019.
27. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 21 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
28. Burton, Business Forum: A Guarantee for Long-Term Trouble, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 20, 1983, sec. 3, at 2, col. 3.
29. Id.
30. 134 CONG. REc. S3,067-68 (dailey ed. Mar, 23, 1988) (statement of Senator
Proxmire).
31. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 20-21 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
32. Burton, supra note 4.
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result in long run benefits for the United States as a trade nation.
Those who advocate change, like Representative Mica, say we need
''sensible legislation," but they pledge that they are not advocating
bribery or corruption.33 Opponents answer, "If it ain't broke ... don't
fix it."'34
C. Purpose of the Amendments
Even those who oppose changes to the Act agree that clarification
of its provisions is appropriate."6 Differences arise, however, regarding
the scope and extent of the changes. The stated purpose of the amend-
ments is to clarify certain provisions of the Act; to clarify standards of
conduct for business persons; and to provide more certainty in
enforcement. 6
The executive branch has not enforced the law vigorously, which,
in itself, may be sufficient reason to amend the Act. Primary enforce-
ment of the accounting standards lies with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Commission may bring action under the antibribery
provisions as well" The Justice Department, however, retains pri-
mary jurisdiction over the enforcement of the antibribery provisions. 38
According to the Justice Department, there are fewer than 20 com-
plaints of violations involving bribery each year. Bribery cases are de-
fended vigorously and since the evidence is overseas, these cases present
unique investigative problems. 39 Still the policy of the Justice Depart-
ment remains to investigate all serious allegations of criminal behavior,
and if the evidence develops, to bring suit.
40
In addition to more efficient administration of the Act, legislators
hope that clarification will lessen "unnecessary paperwork" and allevi-
ate "needless concerns" about criminal liability.4' For businesses, if the
ambiguities in the Act surrounding the accounting and antibribery
33. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 16 (statement of Representative Mica).
34. Rushford, supra note 4.
35. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 40 (statement of Senator Dixon); The An-
tibribrery Act Splits Executives, supra note 25, at 16.
36. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Senator Heinz).
37. Id. at 57-63 (statement of Edward Fleischman, Commissioner, Securities and
Exchange Commission).
38. Id. at 64-74 (statement of John C. Keenex, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
39. Gerth, Easing of Bribery Law Under Fire, N.Y. Times Apr. 30, 1984, sec. D,
at 1, col. 3.
40. Id.
41. 134 CONG. REC. S4,225 (daily ed. April, 19, 1988).
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standards are resolved, these modifications may bring new opportuni-
ties for foreign investment. At the same time, legislators recognize that
the amendments must proscribe bribery while improving the competi-
tive position of U.S. firms in global markets.42
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE ACT
Under a scheme of clarification, the amendments make a number
of subtle, but significant, modifications to the Act. Changes in the ac-
counting provisions limit criminal liability to knowing falsifications of
accounting records, define reasonable detail and assurances by a pru-
dent person standard, and require an issuer who owns 50% or less of
the voting stock to exercise good faith influence on a subsidiary to as-
sure the subsidiary's compliance with the accounting provisions.4"
Amendments to the antibribery provisions replace the controver-
sial "knowing or having reason to know" standard with the require-
ment that U.S. firms have actual knowledge that a third person may
bribe a foreign official. Further, these amendments (1) define prohib-
ited payments as those used to induce a foreign official to violate legal
duties, (2) clarify the types of "facilitating payments" that are allowed,
and (3) provide an affirmative defense for payments that are lawful in
the foreign country and payments that constitute reasonable and bona
fide expenditures directly related to business conducted in that
country.44
Similarly, the modifications repeal the Eckhardt amendment.
Under the new Act, conviction of the company is no longer necessary
for prosecution of employees or agents who violate its provisions.4 5
Other changes include increased criminal and civil sanctions, new civil
subpoena authority in the Justice Department, and a procedure by
which the Attorney General can issue guidelines regarding conduct
that may violate the Act.46 Lastly, the amendments require the Presi-
dent to pursue an international agreement to ban bribery abroad. 7
Having examined the major provisions of the new Act, this article
will focus on three problems that principally account for the impetus to
amend the Act: the "reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances"
42. Senate Hearing, sitpra note 6, at 42 (statement of Senator D'Amato).
43. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (amendments), Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1415 (1988).
44. Id.
45. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 2, at 923.
46. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 43, at 1417-1423.
47. Id. at 1424-1425.
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standards; the "reason to know" standard of culpability; and the prob-
lem of "facilitating payments."
V. CLARIFICATION OF THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. Criticisms of the Prior Standards
Criticism of the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 focuses on the lack of clarity and certainty
caused by the standards. Prior to the amendments, it was possible to
incur liability for just one inaccurate record.48 Uncertainty as to the
interpretation of the provisions resulted in a proliferation of documen-
tation and increased accounting costs.49 In fact, concern over enforce-
ment of technical and insignificant errors in records led to overcomp-
liance without necessarily advancing the purposes of the statute.50 A
1981 General Accounting Office study found that, as a result of com-
pliance, accounting costs increased as much as 35 percent for many
companies and significantly more than that for some.51 This increase in
accounting costs, however, did bring about certain positive results.
These firms received benefits from the mandated internal control, such
as, better management capability, more reliable data, and better infor-
mation for decision-making. 52
B. Actual Changes: Adoption of the Prudent Person Standard
The 1988 amendments to the accounting standards of the Act are
minor, yet significant in responding to these increasing costs. While the
original Act required "reasonable detail" in recordkeeping and "rea-
sonable assurances" from internal accounting controls,53 legislators
failed to delineate the level of precision required under these provisions.
Business people were unable to determine what would be considered
reasonable in the eyes of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). 54 As a result, the new provisions define "reasonable detail"
48. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 60 (statement of Edward Fleischman, Com-
missioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
49. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 34-35 (statement of the Honorable Alexan-
der H. Good, Director General, U.S. and Foreign Commerce Service).
50. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 74 (statement of John C. Kenny, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
51. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 34 (statement of the Honorable Alexander
H. Good, Director General, U.S. and Foreign Commerce Service).
52. Burton, supra note 28.
53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
54. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Representative Roth).
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and "reasonable assurances" at such "level of detail and degree of as-
surances as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of.their own
affairs." 55 Similarly, the 1988 amendments limit criminal liability to
those who "knowingly" circumvent or fail to implement a system of
internal accounting controls or "knowingly" falsify books or records.56
The SEC reports that enforcement of the original Act targeted
knowing and reckless conduct. The Commission, however, tolerated
certain deviations from the Act based on a rational cost-benefit analy-
sis. 57 The new amendments' definition of "reasonable", and the limit on
criminal liability, more accurately codifies this policy. The SEC now
operates under congressional mandate rather than administrative
discretion.
C. Effect of the Changes
The effect of these changes will be less ambiguity in compliance.
By the imposition of the "prudent person" standard, a standard with
which businesses and courts alike are familiar, legislators expect that
the uncertainty that has been experienced heretofore will be replaced
with more efficient systems. With these relatively minor changes in the
1977 Act, the costs associated with maintaining and controlling ac-
counting records will decrease without offending the integrity of the
Act itself. If these modifications result in greater certainty for busi-
nesses in the conduct of their affairs, we will lose very little, if any-
thing, in terms of carrying out the intent of the original Act.
VI. CHANGE IN THE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY
PAYMENTS
A. Criticisms of the Prior Standard
1. Ambiguity
Like the accounting standards of the Act, the "reason to know"
provision that imposed liability for third party payments, caused con-
siderable anxiety among business executives. The difficulty lies in as-
suring that U.S. employees or agents are not making illegal payments
abroad.58 Under the 1977 Act, critics claim that American firms are
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 2, at 916.
56. Id.
57. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 58-59 (statement of Edward Fleischman,
Commissioner , Securities and Exchange Commission).
58. Brownstein, supra note 26, at 2019.
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asked to determine with certainty that a third person will not engage in
illicit conduct, risking criminal prosecution if their judgment about that
person is wrong.5 9 Congress was strongly influenced by testimony that
U.S. citizens should not be held strictly liable for the actions of foreign
agents.60 To many, however, this standard is unnecessarily ambiguous,
and some commentators assert that the purpose of the Act could be
met by a more objective and predictable standard.6 1 Under Justice De-
partment policy, the "reason to know" standard was never used as a
basis for prosecution,62 but prior to the amendments, the possibility ex-
isted that it could be so used.
Despite such provisions, due process requires that the legislature
give reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited. 3 Those who sup-
ported the 1988 amendments argued that the original Act did not'give
such notice, and, therefore, conceivably offended the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Douglas Riggs, General Counsel for the U.S.
Department of Commerce, related that under the 1977 Act, an execu-
tive could be liable for an unauthorized payment simply because he
knew that payments are common in many parts of the world.64 While
liability probably would not lie in such a scenario, the illustration
shows the breadth of the provision and substantiates the fear that exec-
utives experience under the Act.
2. Improper Standard
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the "reason to know" standard is
that it is not a proper basis for imposing criminal liability carrying seri-
ous felony penalties. 65 This standard has no analogue in domestic brib-
ery law. Thus, liability could exist for payments to foreign officials
where no liability would exist if the payments were made to U.S. offi-
cials. 6 Steven Brogan testified that liability under domestic law de-
59. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 76 (statement of Calman Cohan, Vice Presi-
dent, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
60. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 54 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge, Secre-
tary of Commerce).
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 65 (statement of John C. Kenney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
63. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 21 (statement of Representative Berman).
64. Fanning, On the Docket: Am I My Brother's Keeper?, FORBES, May 4, 1987,
at 66.
65. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 97-98 (statement of Steven J. Brogan, Part-
ner, Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue).
66. Id. at 96.
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pends on the person's status as an accomplice to the intermediary. To
be liable as an accomplice, the person must have acted with the intent
that the crime be committed.67 The "reason to know" standard does
not require an intent that the crime be committed. Thus, U.S. firms
confront serious criminal penalties for conduct that is merely negligent;
such an outcome is inconsistent with modern criminal law. 68 Some
commentators have suggested, however, that the "reason to know"
standard, as interpreted by the courts, is tantamount to knowledge or
intent. They further contended that recklessness is also equated with
intent.6 9
Lastly, some authorities have argued that the criminal liability im-
posed for negligent conduct is modified by the word "corruptly" which
actually limits liability to circumstances where there is intent .7 This
interpretation, however, intensified the confusion over the provisions of
the original Act. If the word "corruptly" requires evil intent, then the
"reason to know" standard becomes unnecessary, if not contradictory. 71
B. Changes to the Act
1. Senate and House Versions of the Amendments
In view of these criticisms, the Senate version of the amendment
made it unlawful to direct or authorize expressly or by "course of con-
duct" a third party to make an improper payment. 72 While the pro-
posed amendment did not define "course of conduct, '7 3 the Senate ex-
pressed grave concern over the problem of an executive who sticks his
head "in the sand" and consciously ignores facts that indicate a bribe
will be paid.74 In fact, Senator Proxmire, who opposed any change in
the Act, contended that no corporate official would expressly authorize
a bribe or even engage in a course of conduct that would connect that
official with a bribe. 5 In the wake of concerns that executives might
avoid liability by disregarding particular circumstances, as well as the
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id. at 97.
69. Elden & Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption: The Scienter Requirement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 819, 828-837 (1981).
70. Id. at 823.
71. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 100-101 (statement of Steven J. Brogan,
Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis, and Pogue).
72. H.R. CONF. REP. No. S10,0004 (daily ed. July 15, 1987).
73. Id.
74. 133 CONG. REC. S10,0004 (daily ed. July 15, 1987).
75. 134 CONG. REC. S3,067 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1988) (statement by Senator
Proxmire).
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overriding purpose of clarification, the Senate was prompted to make
clear that such a "course of conduct" would not relieve one of
liability.76
The House bill, on the other hand, imposed criminal liability on
persons who make payments to third parties knowing that the payment
will be used as a bribe.7 7 The knowledge standard employed by the
House version encompassed awareness, substantial certainty, or con-
scious disregard for a high probability that a bribe would be paid.7 8
Also under the House bill, civil liability would attach where the pay-
ment is made while "recklessly disregarding" the fact that it would be
used as a bribe. The term "reckless disregard" was defined as aware-
ness and disregard of a substantial risk. 9
2. Final Version of the Amendments
After committee consideration, the Senate conceded to the House.
The final version employs a knowledge standard which includes a con-
scious purpose to avoid learning the truth about the payment, but
deletes the "reckless disregard" element.8 ° Since the knowledge stan-
dard typically encompasses conscious disregard of facts which would
alert a reasonable person to probable violations,81 congressional concern
over this problem is largely alleviated by the standard adopted. The
knowledge standard encompasses actual knowledge, as distinguished
from the "reason to know" standard which the committee likened to a
negligence standard.82 For further clarity, the committee expressly
stated that mere negligence or inadvertance is not a basis for liability. 3
C. Effect of the Changes
Primarily aimed at alleviating the uncertainty that clouds the an-
tibribery provisions of the 1977 Act, these changes in the required de-
gree of culpability should stimulate foreign trade by small exporters
who refrained from all activity in foreign lands for fear of violating the
76. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 2, at 919.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 100 (statement of Allen B. Green, Chair-
man, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Working Group, International Procurement Com-
mittee, Section of Public Contract Law, American Bar Association).
82. Id.
83. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 2, at 920.
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Act. In addition, larger American businesses will benefit from greater
predictability in the enforcement of these provisions.
VII. CLARIFICATION OF "FACILITATING PAYMENTS" EXCEPTION
A. Criticisms of the Prior Provision
Under the original Act, payments to foreign employees whose du-
ties were "ministerial or clerical" were not prohibited. 4 U.S. corporate
executives view these payments, often called "facilitating" or "grease"
payments, as necessary to conduct business in a foreign country. Since
American executives cannot be sure whether a foreign official's duties
are purely clerical, this exception alleviates very little uncertainty in
the enforcement of the Act.85 While the nature of U.S. officials' duties
is sometimes difficult to ascertain, the problem is magnified in the case
of foreign government officials whose duties are rarely clearly defined
or articulated.8" The 1977 Act nevertheless required an executive to
determine whether the foreign official's duties were in fact "essentially
clerical or ministerial", risking criminal liability if the determination
was erroneous.8 7
B. Change: Exception for "Routine Governmental Action"
The amendments to the Act shift the focus from the person to
whom payment was made to the purpose for which the payment was
made. Specifically, the inquiry is whether the purpose of the payment
falls within those permitted and whether such a payment is customary
in that foreign country to facilitate or expedite performance."8 To ac-
complish this clarification, the amendments create an exception for
"routine governmental action," 89 such that payments for this type of
expediting activity are not prohibited. Under the new provisions, "rou-
tine governmental action" includes obtaining permits, processing gov-
ernment papers, providing police protection and mail pickup, providing
utility service, loading and unloading cargo, and "actions of a similar
84. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
85. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of the Honorable Alexander
H. Good, Director General, U.S. and Foreign Commerce Service).
86. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 79 (statement of Calman Cohan, Vice Presi-
dent, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
87. Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 45 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge, Secre-
tary of Commerce).
88. House Hearing, supra note 8, at 80 (statement of Calman Cohan, Vice Presi-
dent, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
89. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 2, at 921.
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nature."9 The amendments clearly state that such routine action does
not include any decision by a foreign official involving the awarding of
new business or the continuation of business. 1
C. Effect of the Change
Clarification of the exception, will alleviate much foreign trade
disincentive for American firms. Many executives believe that such
''grease payments" are necessary to accomplish even the smallest of
tasks in some countries. If they are sure that such "facilitating pay-
ments" will not result in criminal prosecution, foreign trade may be-
come a more attractive alternative.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A NEW FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act promise to
alleviate some of the uncertainty surrounding the Act since its incep-
tion. While opponents of the changes contend that the Act in its pre-
sent form has been effective in stamping out foreign corruption, sup-
porters claim the Act is costing America much in terms of lost trade
and wasted resources. Since American firms would prefer to do busi-
ness on a purely competitive basis, they support reasonable efforts to
eliminate bribery, 2 but, to many firms, the existing Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act is anything but reasonable.
Addressing these concerns, Congress effected subtle, but signifi-
cant, changes to the prior law. With clarification of the accounting
standards, accounting costs for U.S. businesses are expected to become
more manageable, or at least less burdensome. Similarly, the changes
to the antibribery provisions of the original Act promise to alleviate
some of the uncertainty with regard to compliance. Specifically, Con-
gress replaced the "reason to know" provisions with a knowledge stan-
dard of culpability. This standard encompasses a conscious disregard or
deliberate ignorance of known facts. Finally, the amendments to the
Act clarify the exception for "routine governmental action" by clearly
defining what activities fall within this category, thereby promoting
even greater certainty and incentive for American businesses abroad.
90. Id. at 331, 336.
91. Id.
92. H. Weisberg & E. Reichengerg, supra note 18, at 30.
